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Abstract This paper argues that the subsistence of the
fundamental theorem of contemporary financial mathe-
matics is the ethical concept ‘reciprocity’. The argument is
based on identifying an equivalence between the contem-
porary, and ostensibly ‘value neutral’, Fundamental Theory
of Asset Pricing with theories of mathematical probability
that emerged in the seventeenth century in the context of
the ethical assessment of commercial contracts in a
framework of Aristotelian ethics. This observation, the
main claim of the paper, is justified on the basis of results
from the Ultimatum Game and is analysed within a
framework of Pragmatic philosophy. The analysis leads to
the explanatory hypothesis that markets are centres of
communicative action with reciprocity as a rule of dis-
course. The purpose of the paper is to reorientate financial
economics to emphasise the objectives of cooperation and
social cohesion and to this end, we offer specific policy
advice.
Keywords Financial economics  Reciprocity 
Communicative action  Pragmatism
Introduction
Paul Rubin has coined the term ‘emporiophobia’, meaning
the fear of markets (Rubin 2014). Rubin argues that, not
only is emporiophobia widespread, it is manifested in
legislation that has economic implications detrimental to
society’s well being. He identifies the source of emporio-
phobia as being in an over-emphasis in economics of the
‘competition’ metaphor at the expense of the ‘cooperation’
metaphor and the antidote to emporiophobia is for econo-
mists to switch this focus in their arguments. This paper
supports Rubin’s argument and we will present a stronger
case that reciprocity, a basis of cooperation, is at the heart
of financial economics. We make the stronger case to
enable our beliefs to impact people’s experiences of
markets.
Our case starts by arguing that the foundational theory
of financial mathematics, the Fundamental Theorem of
Asset Pricing (hereafter ‘FTAP’), has its basis in the
Aristotelian virtue ‘Justice’. The FTAP is the theory
underpinning modelling frameworks such as Black–Scho-
les–Merton, Cox–Ross–Rubinstein, Heath–Jarrow–Morton
and the LIBOR Market Models and it is the central theory
of contemporary mathematical approaches to pricing
derivatives employed in financial economics. Its signifi-
cance is in unifying various strands in financial economics:
Samuelson and Merton’s use of stochastic calculus;
CAPM, developed by Treynor and Sharpe; martingales,
employed by Fama in the development of the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis; Arrow and Debreu’s concept of
incomplete markets. In accomplishing this unification, it
represents a paradigm for financial economics.
The argument is made by synthesising an understanding
of contemporary financial mathematics with historical
scholarship. Our argument is based on Aristotelian ethics,
where a correspondence between Justice in exchange,
reciprocity and fairness, and a relationship to mathematics
is identified in Book V, Chapter 5 of Nicomachean Ethics
(Broadie and Rowe 2011, pp. 1132b21–1134a16; Judson
1997). We describe how the concept of probability emerges
in the thirteenth century and develops into a mathematical
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theory of probability in the ethical examination of com-
mercial practice. We then present the main claim, starting
with a review of the FTAP we then provide the core
argument that explains the equivalence between contem-
porary and late seventeenth century ideas. We follow this
analysis by offering an explanation as to why the rela-
tionship between financial mathematics and commercial
morality became obscured in the nineteenth century.
The moral basis of financial economics has been
addressed by a variety of authors, for example, Jackson
(2010) tackles it tangentially by addressing failures in the
curricula of Business Schools, an issue examined in detail
by West (2012). Pre-dating the events of 2007, Horrigan
(1987) undertakes a critical analysis of the moral conse-
quences of certain theories of financial economics that he
labels ‘the New Finance’, including the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis, CAPM and options pricing models. His con-
clusion is that because the financial world is objectified it
becomes ‘‘not a nice place ethically’’. Frankfurter and
McGoun (Frankfurter et al. 2002; Frankfurter 2006) argue
that there is a fundamental problem with ‘‘The methodo-
logical foundation of the established finance paradigm,
which for simplicity I will call the EMH’’ (Frankfurter
2006, p. 134) and offer an alternative paradigm. There is
significant overlap between our position and Frankfurter
(2006) but with a significant difference; we argue that the
EMH is intrinsically fair and our objective is to make this
explicit.
Both Horrigan and Frankfurter and McGoun highlight
the issue that there is a dichotomy between fact and value
that originates in Hume and even authors who reject an
analytic/synthetic distinction in philosophy, such as Quine,
do not admit that there can be a moral dimension to
mathematics (Misak 2002, p. 85). This fact/value dichot-
omy creates a barrier that inhibits ethical analysis of
overtly mathematical themes, explaining the paucity of
literature addressing the ethical implications of financial
economics, as compared to scholarship on ethics in other
technology based professions. In our analysis, we ignore
the fact/value dichotomy by adopting an approach founded
on Pragmatic philosophy (Putnam 2002). Pragmatism is
especially relevant to finance because it addresses the
thorny issue of truth when we cannot rely on objectivity,
neutrality and determinism and because it acknowledges
the role of ethics in science. Specifically, by rejecting the
ideology of the fact/value dichotomy, we claim that the
principle heuristic for the technical results of the FTAP, the
‘Dutch book argument’, is equivalent to the ‘Golden
Rule’—‘‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you’’. The consequence of this claim is that the principle of
‘no arbitrage’ in pricing contingent claims, at the heart of
‘New Finance’, is infused with the moral concept of reci-
procity, or fairness, which is integral in cooperation.
The argument is centred on financial markets, but the
identification of the basis of asset pricing in reciprocity has
broader economic significance. For example, consider
Pindyck (2013) that argues that economic cases for taking
actions today to mitigate the long term consequences of
climate change rest on taking a very low discount rate, and
so are difficult to justify with mainstream financial theory.
Low rates are justified by rejecting profit seeking market
rates in favour of the principle of inter-generational reci-
procity and it is difficult, as demonstrated in Stern (2008,
II.B) to do this persuasively using conventional economic
arguments. The case that finance is based on reciprocity,
not on profit maximisation, immediately justifies the
arguments in Stern for inter-generational reciprocity, in
particular, and long-term investment at low, but sure,
returns, in general.
The argument that contemporary asset pricing is infused
with the moral concept of Justice that we present can be
used: to challenge beliefs concerning the immorality of
markets, highlighted by Rubin; to present the ‘New
Finance’ as having ethical foundations, redressing Horri-
gan’s concerns; and to support Stern’s principle of inter-
generational reciprocity in investment analysis. However,
in order to achieve our objective of contributing to a re-
orientation of finance such that it focuses on the objective
social cohesion we need to robustly justify our claim. To
motivate this justification we will identify some issues
raised in Rubin’s speech.
Rubin concludes his argument with the following
remark
[The market] system is moral because it maximises
human welfare. It provides the most goods and ser-
vices feasible, and provides them in the least cost
way. The lives of ordinary people under capitalism
are as happy as it is possible for them to be. No other
system can make this claim. This measure of morality
is a pure output based measure: capitalism is moral
because of what it produces. People do not fully
grasp the moral benefits of capitalism because we
tend to focus on competition, which is only a tool,
rather than on cooperation, which is the actual goal of
the economic system. (Rubin 2014, my italics)
In light of persistent crises in finance since 2007 many
argue, reasonably and rationally, that ‘capitalism is
immoral because of what it produces’. Both the US and
UK legislatures challenge the morality of contemporary
markets. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC)
concluded that in the lead up to The Crisis there had been a
‘‘systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics’’ (FCIC
2011). The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Stan-
dards (PCBS 2013) pointedly titled their comprehensive
report ‘‘Changing Banking for Good’’, emphasising that
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finance should reorientate itself in an explicitly moral
direction.
Rubin’s suggestion that economists should emphasise
cooperation in their intra-disciplinary discussions will not
be sufficient to redirect finance in the time-frame society
demands. The problem Rubin faces is the one that Cheryl
Misak addresses when she asks ‘‘Why must we value
cooperation and equality’’ (Misak 2002, p. 26). Simply
stating that cooperation is a preferable metaphor will not
change the attitudes of a trader who believes manipulation
is justified in the quest for profits. Rubin’s closing remark,
apart from the final sentence, do not challenge the trader’s
beliefs. This observation entails that we focus on Rubin’s
final sentence and the actual goal of the financial system.
To this end we shall adopt the Aristotelian position that
profit is a good external to financial markets, the good
internal to the markets is the transfer of commodities, and
credit, in support of social cohesion. This observation is in
the spirit of MacIntyre (2013, Chap. 14, esp. p. 188) and,
with reference to Rubin’s discussion of the use of sporting
metaphors in economics, it invites the comment that the
good internal to sport could well be the development of
teamwork or physical excellence, not the objective of
winning.
Another issue that emerges out of Rubin’s argument is
more clearly highlighted in Caplan’s earlier identification
of emporiophobia, as an anti-market bias, in his critique of
democracy (Caplan 2007). Caplan’s argument is essentially
that democracies fail because the voting public is unable to
rationally identify what is good for them, such as the profit-
seeking market mechanism in distributing resources. There
are a number of problems with Caplan’s thesis. The
experience from the natural and physical sciences is that
the public cannot be brought to appreciate or correctly
interpret scientific results just through better education in
science; public understanding of science has been super-
seded by public engagement with science. The relevance of
this observation is that while there have been two signifi-
cant environmental disasters since 2009—Deep Water
Horizon (2010) and Fukishima Daiichi (2011)—which
appear to have been resolved in public opinion, financial
disasters have not. The implication is that intra-disciplinary
discussions are not going to resolve the issue of
emporiophobia.
A second problem is that Rubin highlights the impact of
emporiophobic legislation while Caplan’s argument has
been described as ‘‘probably the most widely read anti-
democratic work of the post-Cold War era’’ (Gilley 2009,
p. 120). It seems hopeful to believe that democratic legis-
lators can be influenced by employing, what is perceived to
be, anti-democratic rhetoric. If we intend to influence
legislators we need to offer reasons they can accept.
Beyond offering politically palatable reasons this
immediately raises the question as to whether these reasons
can be the abstract mathematical proofs of financial eco-
nomics. Caplan’s thesis has also been challenged on the
basis that he assumes what is true is determined by the
consensus of what post-doctoral economists agree on, and
this agreement is a consequence of the economists’
adherence to rational choice theory, which in turn posits
that people should be objective utility maximisers. Our
hypothesis on the moral content of the FTAP offers an
alternative definition of what is rational to Caplan’s and
provides a narrative that could make the abstract results of
financial mathematics comprehensible to a broader public.
Given that the central thesis of this paper is concerned
with reciprocity and Justice, we might expect that Rawls’ A
Theory of Justice appears in the discussion. Because we
rely on the Aristotelian framework we do not need Rawls.
Another reason for not employing Rawls is given by Misak
(2002, pp. 18–29) and is based on Rawls’ position that
‘Justice is political not metaphysical’. What this means is
that Justice, reciprocity, cooperation, and so forth, are
implicit in liberal democracies, but are not transcendentally
true. This was not the Aristotelian position. The implica-
tion, as Misak makes clear, is that Rawlsians cannot say
that the objective of cooperation is right (Misak 2002,
p. 26). When Rubin quotes the libertarian Arthur C.
Brooks’ emphatic statement that ‘‘The purpose of free
enterprise is human flourishing, not materialism.’’ we can
sense that Rubin wishes to cross Rawls’ ideological barrier
and state that cooperation has precedence over competi-
tion. We justify our rejection of Rawls’ political Justice in
favour of a transcendental conception of reciprocity on the
basis of the evidence from the Ultimatum Game that
indicates that the principle of reciprocity is universal in
communities that engage in commercial exchange; it is not
confined to liberal democracies. These results only
emerged in the mid-1990s after Rawls had developed his
theories.
Having presented arguments to address these concerns
we then assume it is justified to claim that reciprocity is a
key foundation of financial economics and offer an
explanation for this fact: markets are centres of commu-
nicative action. Habermas developed the theory of com-
municative action to explain how democracies arrive at a
consensus; we are interested in how markets arrive at a
price and discuss the analogy. In the context of markets,
reciprocity is one of the rules of discourse, alongside
sincerity and charity, and develops in the practice of
commerce to enable the achievement of social cohesion—
the good internal to commerce. We are particularly
interested in the role of mathematics in the price-setting
process, and identify it as a mechanism of discourse.
Specifically, the function of mathematics is to bring
market participants to a shared understanding, it is not to
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determine a true price. Essentially we adopt a pragmatic
meaning, rather than a propositional (truth-bearing)
meaning for mathematics. There are implications of
regarding markets as centres of communicative action on
the practice and regulation of markets that we discuss in
final part of ‘‘A Pragmatic Approach to Commerce’’ sec-
tion with reference to: peer-to-peer lending and crowd-
funding; order stuffing in high-frequency trading; and the
LIBOR manipulation scandal.
Rubin’s discussion centres on cooperation and compe-
tition; we will claim that cooperation is central to financial
economics by considering the concept of reciprocity, which
is a feature of bipartite relations while cooperation is a
more complex phenomenon involving many interactions.
We we base our approach on Sahlins’ discussion of the
significance of reciprocity in primitive economies [Sahlins
1972 (2003, Chap. 5)] and the proposition that reciprocity
is the basis of human sociality presented in Henrich et al.
(2004). Our use of ‘reciprocity’ in this paper is equivalent
to Sahlins’ ‘balanced reciprocity’, which is associated with
the ‘tribal sector’ where the degree of separation between
agents is small. Trivers (1971) developed a model for how
reciprocity evolves into cooperation in less connected
networks based on the probability of repeated interactions
that Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) adapted for the social
sciences. Essentially, we assume that reciprocity is a fea-
ture of connected markets, where there is a likelihood of
repeated interactions, and necessary for cooperation to
emerge in less connected, more anonymous, markets.
Competition comes into play when, for example, a buyer is
offered prices by more than one seller. We shall focus on
fairness in the reciprocal relationship between a buyer and
seller, we shall only touch on the ‘fairness’ between sellers
that enables competition by identifying sincerity, alongside
reciprocity, as a norm of market discourse. This is partic-
ularly relevant in the huge, and relatively anonymous, LI-
BOR and foreign exchange markets that have been hit by
scandals recently and in impersonal algorithmic trading.
Another aspect of fairness that we touch upon is the fair-
ness between agents of different status and we propose this
is handled through the norm of charity. This is relevant if
there is a difference in monetary or information wealth
between agents and it is important in addressing the mis-
selling of financial products, such as sub-prime mortgages
or high interest loans.
The paper is structured as follows. ‘‘The Emergence of
Probability’’ section begins with a description of medieval
financial practice that highlights the sophistication and
complexity of European commerce at the time. This is
followed by a discussion of Scholastic analysis of com-
mercial practice based on Nicomachean Ethics, this ana-
lysis is the genesis of mathematical probability. We then
move on to explain the development of the mathematical
theory of probability in the context of ethical investigations
of commercial practice. ‘‘The Fundamental Theorem of
Asset Pricing’’ section starts by explaining the develop-
ment and significance of the FTAP. Then, building on the
discussion in ‘‘The Emergence of Probability’’ section, it
presents the main claim in an analysis of the FTAP as an
ethical statement focusing on a correspondence between
‘no arbitrage’, ‘equal conditions’ and ‘martingale mea-
sures’. Acknowledging the ethical nature of modern prob-
ability we offer an interpretation of Ramsey’s Dutch Book
argument as a re-statement of the Golden Rule: ‘Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you’. The final part
of ‘‘The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing’’ section
offers an explanation as to why the ethical nature of
probability was obscured in the nineteenth century. We see
this as an example of the process described in Adorno and
Horkeimer’s Dialectic of the Enlightenment that is specif-
ically concerned with a simultaneous ‘taming of chance’
(Hacking 1990) with a growing concern for problems of
scarcity. In ‘‘A Pragmatic Approach to Commerce’’ section
we employ Pragmatic philosophy to provide reasons to
justify our claim, with the main justification coming from
the empirical results of the Ultimatum Game. We then
offer a meaning for the claim by employing some of
Habermas’ ideas in The Theory of Communicative Action
that were developed in response to the Dialectic of the
Enlightenment and we relate these ideas to contemporary
practice. We end this section by discussing some impli-
cations of linking our hypothesis to practice. Specifically,
we hope that the public become more engaged with
finance, rather than being passive consumers of financial
products. Tangible consequences of our hypothesis would
be regulatory support for mutual, non-profit seeking,
mechanisms in finance and the inhibition of practices such
as order-stuffing on automated exchanges.
The Emergence of Probability
Medieval Finance
From 1000 C.E. until about 1300 C.E. there was a rapid
development of the economy in Western Europe as it
evolved from an agriculturally based feudal society
towards a commercially based bourgeois society, initially
in Italy then, in the twelfth century, in North Western
Europe. One physical manifestation of this change was the
volume of coin circulating in the European economy, as the
population doubled over the three hundred years, the
amount of coin per person tripled (Pounds 1994, Chaps. 3
and 4; Kaye 1998, pp. 15–16; Nicholas 2006, p. 72).
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Practice
Medieval European merchants, unlike their contemporaries
in the Middle East, India or China, had to contend simul-
taneously with prohibitions on usury and the heterogeneity
of currency. Muslim merchants had usury prohibitions but
homogeneous currency, Indian and Chinese merchants had
to (sometimes) deal with heterogeneous currencies but
without the centralised religious prohibitions on usury.
Usury derives from the Latin usus meaning ‘use’, and
referred to the charging of a fee for the use of money.
Interest comes from the Latin interesse and originated in
the Roman legal codes as the compensation paid if a
contract was broken (Homer and Sylla 1996, p. 73). Shortly
after 1200 the theologian, Peter the Chanter, argued that ‘‘a
buyer or seller may be excused from usury if he exposes
himself to the risk of receiving more or less’’ (Franklin
2001, pp. 263–264) and this idea that usury was absent in
the presence of risk became firmly established in the thir-
teenth century.
The basic financial instrument at this time was the
census that originated when ninth century monasteries
guaranteed a fixed regular income in exchange for a
donation of land. Censii developed to be written on the
back of a diverse range of assets, including a craftsman’s
labour, resembling modern day securitisation. In time
‘structured’ contracts emerged such that a borrower would
receive a lump sum secured against the future cash-flow
from an asset, rente a` prix d’argent, without necessarily
relinquishing ownership of the asset (Homer and Sylla
1996, pp. 75–76; Poitras 2000, pp. 31–33).
Modern structured finance was anticipated in the triple,
or German, contract (contractus trinus), developed to fund
long distance trade (Decock 2012). It involved a loan to
fund the venture (the first contract); the transformation of
the variable return of the venture into fixed cash-flow (the
second contract); and an insurance contract to guarantee
the fixed payment (the third contract). In terms of con-
temporary finance, this third contract is a Credit Default
Swap and the whole contract has the type of structure of a
Special Purpose Vehicle. This contract was declared illicit
by the Catholic Church in 1586 on the basis that the lender
received a risk-less return (Noonan 1957, pp. 209–220).
The heterogeneity of currency was a consequence of
feudalism and the desire of magnates to assert their
authority by issuing coin. The Italian peninsula had over
twenty currencies, the Kingdom of France three, and each
prince of the Holy Roman Empire would mint their own
coin. Alfred Crosby describes the activities of a Tuscan
merchant in supplying cloth to Venice from Mallorcan
wool that involved at least five currencies (Crosby 1997,
p. 201) . William Goetzman explains that as a consequence
of the multitude of currencies, European medieval
merchants ‘‘operated in a world of complete relativism’’
(Goetzmann 2004) while Crosby remarks that there was an
‘‘abstraction of Western merchants’ scale of value’’ and
‘‘no people were more obsessed with counting and count-
ing and counting’’ (Crosby 1997, pp. 72, 74)
A solution to the problem of the complexity of Medieval
commerce came in Fibonacci’s Liber Abaci first published
in 1202, the initiant of financial economics (Crosby 1997,
pp. 43–47; Fibonacci and Sigler 2003, Introduction). It was
an immediate success and a second edition was produced in
1228, a remarkable feat in an age when books were hand
copied. The text introduces Arabic/Hindu numerals and
explains basic arithmetic over seven chapters. It then pre-
sents four chapters applying the theory by presenting cases
on practical commercial problems. The text finishes with a
more theoretical section on iterating to a solution of a
problem (Fibonacci and Sigler 2003; Goetzmann 2004).
Before the Liber Abaci, European merchants, like their
contemporaries across the globe, would have used an
abacus to perform arithmetic calculations, and once a cal-
culation had been made, it was recorded. The technologies
described in the Liber Abaci, particularly Hindu numbers,
meant that merchants could write down their calculation
method, the algorithm, which could be copied and modified
by others. Knowledge, in the form of best practice, could
be created, distributed and improved.
Abaco or rekoning schools sprang up throughout Europe
teaching apprentice merchants the techniques originating
the Liber Abaci. The impact of these abaco schools was
enormous, algebra became an important tool used by the
large and influential community of Europeans and would
provide the reservoir of mathematicians on which the sci-
entific developments of the seventeenth century were built.
The unique circumstances of medieval European commer-
cial practice offer a solution to Needham’s question that asks
why European technological development accelerated so
much faster than Chinese after 1600 (Hadden 1994, Chap. 1;
Fibonacci and Sigler 2003, Introduction; Heeffer 2008).
Theory
The science that emerged in Western Europe in the sev-
enteenth century is distinctive in its use of mathematics to
describe the laws of nature. The Greeks, and their Muslim
successors, generally regarded ‘pure’ mathematics as being
irrelevant to the sensible world while Chinese scientists
used mathematics to calculate but not to describe (Crosby
1997, p. 16; Dear 2001, p. 164; Fara 2009, p. 53). Richard
Hadden, Alfred Crosby and Joel Kaye have all argued that
the ‘mathematisation’ of European science began with the
synthesis of commercial practice and Scholastic ethics in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Hadden 1994;
Crosby 1997; Kaye 1998).
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A key component of this synthesis was Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics that addresses how an individual can
live as part of a community and it discusses economics in
Book V in the context of the virtue of Justice. Aristotle
distinguishes economic justice into two main classes, dis-
tributive (in V.3) and restorative (or corrective, in V.4).
Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of
common goods by a central authority in proportion to the
recipients’ worth and is determined by equating Geometric
Proportions. Restorative justice applies in cases where the
parties are considered to be equal but there has been an
erroneous allocation which is corrected by equating
Arithmetic Proportions (Kaye 1998, pp. 41–43; Broadie
and Rowe 2011, pp. 1130b30–31a5)
Our case is built on the discussion of ‘justice in associa-
tions for exchange’ in V.5, which has proved problematic for
commentators over the centuries (Judson 1997). Justice in
exchange is distinguished from distributive and restorative
justice by being characterised by proportionate equality.
Fundamental to this principle is that there is an equality of
goods exchanged, ‘‘there is no giving in exchange’’, since it
is a reciprocal arrangement, nor is there a corrective aspect
to exchange. Reciprocity in exchange is essential in binding
society together, it is important for social cohesion not in
order to generate a profit (Kaye 1998, p. 51; Broadie and
Rowe 2011, pp. 1133a15–30). These points are explained in
detail by Judson (1997), who begins his article with a
statement relevant to our discussion
Aristotle’s concern is solely with an ethical question,
namely ‘What is the basis of fairness in the exchange
of goods?’, and not with economic analysis of any
sort, even as a subordinate part of ethical enquiry.
(Judson 1997, pp. 147–148, emphasis in the original)
Aristotle’s argument is ethical and mathematical and
justice in exchange is concerned with fairness and equality
in order to establish social cohesion. It is not an economic
analysis in the sense of the modern understanding of
addressing a problem of efficiently distributing scarce
resources.
It is remarkable that Aristotle approached the problem
mathematically since he rarely applied mathematics to the
sensible world elsewhere (Hadden 1994, p 75; Crosby
1997, p. 13; Broadie and Rowe 2011, pp. 1094b15–28).
Aristotle realised that if there was to be equality then
everything that is exchanged must be somehow com-
parable. This is the role that is fulfilled by currency
[nomisma], so that it becomes, in a way, an interme-
diate. (Broadie and Rowe 2011, pp. 1133a19–20)
These lines are significant for two reasons. Firstly the word
nomisma for currency/money is related to the concepts of
custom and law, not to ‘labour and expenses’. Second,
‘intermediate’ is in the sense of a mediator between two
objects, rather than simply as a token, which is a more
modern interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle defined the
quality that money measured by the word chreia, which
was initially translated to opus (work), but was later
corrected to indigentia (need) (Kaye 1998, pp. 68–70). This
is important because it demonstrates that Aristotle and the
Scholastics viewed money as a social construction binding
society by allowing an exchange based on need, rather than
as a simple commodity facilitating the exchange of sensible
quantities, such as labour and expenses.
The significance of the Scholastic analysis to the
development of science was that when Aristotle discussed
measurement in the context of physics he argued that the
measure shared the ‘substance’ of the measured; this meant
that wine was incommensurable with cloth, time incom-
mensurable with space. The Scholastics recognised that
money was a very special measure; it applied to all goods
in a market, and only occasionally shared the substance of
the goods. This insight enabled them to revolutionise the
concept of measurement, in a way that contemporary
Muslim scholars did not, and allowed Jean Buridan to
identify the concept of inertia (Boyer and Merzbach 1991,
pp. 263–268; Crosby 1997, pp. 67–74; Kaye 1998,
pp. 65–70).
Out of Aristotle’s discussion of market exchange,
Scholastics developed the concept of the ‘Just Price’,
which has been the subject of considerable modern debate.
For example, Raymond de Roover (1958) argues against
viewing the Just Price in a Marxist, labour theory of value,
sense but rather as the market price, in a neo-classical,
liberal sense. However, neither of these modern positions
corresponds to how the Scholastics viewed the concept.
The interpretation of the Just Price we shall employ, based
on the Scholastic attitudes to Aristotle’s description of
exchange, is the one discussed by Monsalve (2014). The
Just Price represents an ‘‘intellectual construct: an ideal
price that guarantees equality in exchange’’ and that it
represents a mathematical ‘medium’ or a ‘mean’.
Monsalve points out that Scholastic analysis was con-
ducted in a definite moral frame of reference and so the Just
Price ‘‘could not refer indiscriminately to whatever price
might be obtained in the market’’ (Monsalve 2014, p. 8,
quoting Langholm). This aspect was discussed in detail by
the Scholastics prompted by a question ‘Whether the seller
is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?’ posed by
Aquinas (1947, II, ii, qu. 77, art. 3, ad. 4). Specifically
Aquinas addresses a problem originating in Stoic philoso-
phy relating to the conduct of a merchant carrying a supply
of food to a starving country. The merchant knows that
they are the first of a number of merchants bringing food,
the question is, should he sell the food at the high ‘market’
price or a lower price based on his knowledge.
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Kaye makes the point that Aquinas separates the Just
Price, determined by divine law, from the ‘market price’,
established bymen, and explains that if the Just Price equated
with the market price then an ‘‘individual’s responsibility in
economic activity is effectively eliminated’’ (Kaye 1998,
p. 98). Despite recognising this distinction, the answer from
Aquinas is a little surprising. Aquinas observes that the
merchant may believe that there are more grain shipments on
the way, but does not know: the future is uncertain. On the
basis that there is no certainty, and on the authority of Peter
the Chanter, the merchant may charge the going market
price, making an excessive but nevertheless legitimate profit,
though it would be more virtuous to charge the lower price.
Aquinas’ conclusion is surprising because it suggests the
merchant can be insincere in his actions.
Aquinas’ argument was criticised by Pierre Jean Olivi, a
leader of the ‘Spiritual Franciscans’. The Spiritual Fran-
ciscans argued that the vow of poverty meant monks
should limit their use of property, usus pauper, a more
severe restriction than just not owning property. As a
consequence of this extreme position Olivi was posthu-
mously condemned as a heretic in 1326, hindering the
subsequent transmission of his thought. The Franciscans,
unlike the empirical rationalist Dominicans such as Tho-
mas Aquinas, were fideists and this philosophical approach
meant that Olivi argued that the metaphysical probability
of more grain arriving had a certain reality, which Aquinas
was ignoring (Kaye 1998, p. 121). Olivi said
The judgement of the value of a thing in exchange
seldom or never can be made except through con-
jecture or probable opinion, and not so precisely, or
as if understood and measured by one invisible point,
but rather as a fitting latitude within which the diverse
judgements of men will differ in estimation. (Kaye
1998, p. 124).
This distinction is essential in demarcating the Just Price,
an imprecise abstraction, from the market price, which is
observed at a fixed point (Monsalve 2014, Sect. 3.2.1).
Olivi seems to have interacted with merchants and been
a close observer of markets and considered a number of
aspects of commerce including the problem of usury
(Franklin 2001, p. 265). Based on the principle that a
lender could charge a borrower compensation for a loss
(interesse) Olivi recognised that borrowers should com-
pensate lenders for the ‘probable profit’ they could earn by
employing capital elsewhere. Fair exchange was a question
of restoring ‘probable equivalence’, not of precise equality
(Kaye 1998, p. 119; Franklin 2001, pp. 265–267). As part
of this argument Olivi commented that a valuation did not
only depend on ‘need’ but also on a good’s scarcity, use-
fulness and desirability. Since both need and desirability
are subjective, different people will value the same good
differently and based on these ideas, Olivi was able also to
explain the ‘value paradox’ (Rothbard 1996, pp. 60–61;
Kaye 1998, pp. 123–124). Ultimately, according to James
Franklin, Olivi thought of probability as a trade-able entity,
and so could be quantified (Franklin 2001, pp. 266–267).
The Science of Conjecture
The Science of Conjecture, or Probability, is the rational
method for dealing with uncertainty. Aristotle classified
events into three types: certain events determined by spe-
cific causes; probable events that usually happened; and
unpredictable events, including games of chance, not
amenable to science (Hald 1990, p. 30). The development
of Probability over the past five hundred years has been
concerned principally with reducing the scope of those
events ‘not amenable to science’ in support of the Cartesian
programme to place knowledge on indubitable foundations
(Grayling 2005, pp. 281–285).
While Olivi and merchants developed the idea of
probability in relation to commercial exchange and jurists
and theologians addressed questions of proof, the concept
of quantifying chance did not fully materialise until the
mid-sixteenth century with Cardano’s Liber de Ludo Alea.
Ian Hacking has remarked Hacking (1984, Chap. 1) that
the emergence of the concept of absolute chance was late;
however, this identification of mathematical probability in
the context of finance precedes both Descartes’ introduc-
tion of absolute space (Cartesian co-ordinates) and New-
ton’s of absolute time.
Up until the 1950s, and a re-assessment of his work by
Ore (1953), Cardano’s contribution to probability theory
had been widely ignored. In the context frequentist inter-
pretations of probability, that dominated the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, it was seen as incoherent. More
recently, Bellhouse (2005) has re-evaluated the Liber
looking at it as a humanist philosophical text, not as a
mathematical document, based on the fact that Cardano,
himself, did not list it as one of his mathematical works.
Bellhouse’s hypothesis is that in the Liber Cardano is
trying to establish under what grounds gambling can be
considered ethical in the context of Nicomachean Ethics.
Cardano latches on to the idea that Justice is equivalent
to equality and argues that in dice games ‘equality’ was
established by counting the ways a player could win and
comparing that number to the ways a player would lose. On
this basis the ‘chance’ of winning could be deduced, and if
the stakes did not match the chances, the gamble was
unjust. Summarising his findings he states, ‘‘a just gamble
is one between willing and knowledgeable players’’,
making an explicit association between science and ethics.
Almost immediately after coming to these ethical conclu-
sions, Cardano observes that
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These facts contribute a great deal to understanding
but hardly anything to practical play (David 1998,
p. 58) quoting from Chapter 9 of the Liber)
since they offer nothing to help forecast the outcome of the
dice throw.
One problem Cardano considered was the so-called
Problem of Points which appears in a text by Pacioli and is
based on the following situation:
Two players, F and P, are playing a game based on a
sequence of rounds, and each round consists of, for
example, the tossing of a fair coin. The winner of the
game is the player who is the first to win 7 rounds,
and they will win 80 francs.
The Problem of Points is how the 80 francs should be split
if the game is forced to end after F has won 5 rounds while
F has won 4. Edith Dudley Sylla notes that the Problem
comes from the abaco tradition of using ‘stories’ to give
examples of how to solve problems in commercial
arithmetic. In this case the Problem of Points, the story
represents the case of how the capital tied up in a business
partnership should be divided if the venture has to finish
prematurely (Sylla 2003).
Pacioli’s solution was statistical, the pot should be split
5:4. Cardano recognised this was absurd since it would
give a manifestly unfair result if the game ended after one
round out of a hundred or when F had 99 wins to P’s 90.
Cardano makes the point that the correct solution would be
arrived at by considering what would happen in the future,
it had to be forward-looking, in particular, it had to account
for what ‘paths’ the game would follow. Despite this
insight, Cardano’s solution was still wrong, and the correct
solution was provided by Pascal and Fermat in their cor-
respondence of 1654.
The Pascal–Fermat solution to the Problem of Points is
widely regarded as the starting point of mathematical
probability. The pair (it is not known exactly who) realised
that when Cardano calculated that P could win the pot if
the game followed the path PP (i.e. P wins and P wins
again) this actually represented four paths, PPPP, PPPF,
PPFP, PPFF, for the game. It was the players’ ‘choice’
that the game ended after PP, not a feature of the game
itself and this represents an early example of mathemati-
cians disentangling behaviour from problem structure.
Calculating the proportion of winning paths would come
down to using the Arithmetic, or Pascal’s, Triangle—the
Binomial distribution. Essentially, Pascal and Fermat
established what would today be recognised as the Cox–
Ross–Rubenstein formula (Cox et al. 1979) for pricing a
digital call option.
The Pascal–Fermat correspondence was private, the first
textbook on probability was written by Christiaan Huygens
in 1656. Huygens had visited Paris in late 1655 and had
been told of the Problem of Points, but not of its solution
(David 1998, p. 111); Hald 1990, p. 67), and on his return
to the Netherlands he solved the problem for himself and
produced the first treatise on mathematical probability, Van
Rekeningh in Speelen van Geluck (‘On the Reckoning of
Games of Chance’) in 1657.
In Van Rekeningh Huygens starts with, what is essen-
tially, an axiom,
I take as fundamental for such [fair] games that the
chance to gain something is worth so much that, if
one had it, one could get the same in a fair game, that
is a game in which nobody stands to lose.(Hald 1990,
p. 69)
Probability is defined by equating future gain with present
value in the context of ‘fair’ games.
In the 1670’s probability theory developed in the context
of Louis XIV’s appartements du roi, thrice weekly gam-
bling events that have been described as a ‘symbolic
activity’ not unlike potlach ceremonies that bind primitive
communities (Kavanagh 1993, pp. 31–42). This mathe-
matical analysis of an important social activity stimulated
the publication of books describing objective, or frequen-
tist, probability. The empirical, frequentist, approach began
to dominate the mathematical treatment of probability
following the claimed ‘defeat’, or ‘taming’, of chance by
mathematics with the publication of Montmort’s Essay
d’Analyse sur les Jeux de Hazard (‘Analytical Essay on
Games of Chance’) of 1708 and De Moivre’s De Mensura
Sortis (‘The Measurement of Chance’), of 1711 developed
in The Doctrine of Chances of 1718 (Bellhouse 2008).
These texts were developed in response to ‘fixed odds’
games of chance rather than in the analysis of commercial
contracts. The Doctrine was the more influential, intro-
ducing the Central Limit Theorem, and by 1735 it was
believed that there was no longer a class of events that were
‘unpredictable’ (Bellhouse 2008).
Around 1684 James Bernoulli had begun working on
problems in probability and between 1700 and his death in
1705 he worked on Ars Conjectandi (‘The Art of Conjec-
turing’), a title that emphases the practical rather than
theoretical nature of conjecture, which was published
posthumously in 1713. The Ars is made up of four parts, a
commentary on Huygens’ Van Rekeningh, original work on
calculating permutations and combinations, applications of
these ideas to games of chance and finally the application
of the ideas to ‘‘civil, moral and economic affairs’’ (Hald
1990, p. 224).
While the first three sections of the Ars are un-contro-
versial, the final section is both the most significant and has
proved problematic. Bernoulli, having discussed objective
probability at length introduces the epistemic, or
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subjective, definition of probability as ‘‘a degree of cer-
tainty’’. Anders Hald notes that this is ‘‘revolutionary’’
because Bernoulli is applying mathematics to propositions,
not just to events (Hald 1990, p. 225). This section of the
Ars is significant in that it introduces what would become
known as the ‘Law of Large Numbers’, which can be
summarised as collecting a large amount of data will
improve the accuracy of an observation—providing the
system was stationary (Hald 1990, p. 225). The section is
problematic because Bernoulli considered situations where
the sum of probabilities could be greater than one (Sylla
2006, p. 27). This is impossible if probability is calculated
as relative frequency.
Sylla compared Bernoulli’s work to that of Huygens’
and other contemporaries, de Witt and de Moivre, in the
process of translating the Ars and concluded that
equity among associates or partners rather than
probabilities in the sense of relative frequencies
provided the foundation for the earliest mathematical
probability theory. (Sylla 2006, p. 13)
and that
While traditional histories of mathematical proba-
bility start with Pierre Fermat, Pascal and Huygens
because they give what are from the modern point of
view correct frequentist solutions to the problems of
division and expectations in games of chance ...the
foundations of Huygens’ method (…) was not chance
(frequentist probability), but rather sors (expectation)
in so far as it was involved in implicit contracts and
the just treatment of partners. (Sylla 2006, p. 28)
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the motivation
for the development of probability was in the ethical
analysis of commercial contracts where Justice, balanced
reciprocity or ‘fairness’ dominated. The later Empirical
approach to probability, based on observing relative
frequencies, emerged out of the simpler analysis of games
of chance in the context of fixed odds.
The case that Huygens was working in the context of
Virtue Ethics is enhanced by recognising the difficulty he
had in translating Van Rekeningh into Latin (Hacking 1984,
pp. 93–94). Huygens struggled to translate the Dutch word
kans (‘chance’, ‘lot’), which would normally be translated
as sors, and eventually he, or his editor van Schooten,
chose expectatio, giving the English term ‘expectation’ (in
the mathematical sense). However, Huygens had consid-
ered using the Latin word spes (Hacking 1984, p. 95)
which was the term for the virtue ‘Hope’. In French, es-
pe´rance is used when referring to mathematical expecta-
tion, reflecting this debate. The Dutch, who following
Stevin’s focus on teaching mathematics in the vernacular,
use their own terms in mathematics, in this case the
equivalent is verwachting: hope, promise, expectation,
forecast, prognosis.
Sylla also observes that The Port Royal Logic, a sig-
nificant influence on Pascal, notes that ‘‘because the house
takes part of the stakes, lotteries are manifestly unfair’’ and
seventeenth century mathematicians recognised a distinc-
tion between actual gambles, involving transaction costs,
and idealised, frictionless, markets, suitable for the math-
ematical study by academics (Sylla 2003, p. 327).
The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing consists of two
statements, (e.g. (Shreve 2004, Section 5.4))
(1) A market admits no arbitrage, if and only if, the
market has a martingale measure.
(2) Every contingent claim can be hedged, if and only if,
the martingale measure is unique.
The Context of the FTAP
The FTAP emerged between 1979 and 1983 (Harrison and
Kreps 1979; Harrison and Pliska 1981, 1983) as Michael
Harrison sought to establish a mathematical theory under-
pinning the Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) equation for
pricing options, which was introduced in 1973.
In the late 1960s, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes
worked as investment consultants and one of the problems
the pair addressed was the valuation of ‘warrants’, options
bundled with bonds. Black was an applied mathematician
who had worked in consultancy for Jack Treynor around
the time that Treynor developed his version of the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Scholes had studied for a
doctorate under Eugene Fama looking at risk-reward in the
context of efficient markets (Scholes 1972). Black tackled
the problem of pricing warrants as an applied mathemati-
cian: the value of the warrant would be a function of the
underlying asset’s price and amenable to the type of cal-
culus that had been employed since Newton and Leibnitz.
Scholes approached the problem from a financial per-
spective: the risk of holding a warrant could be removed by
holding a complementary (short) position in the underlying
asset, by hedging. What Scholes did not know was how to
establish the size of the hedging portfolio, but when he
discussed this with Black they realised the solution was in
the slope of the function relating the warrant price and asset
price, a result that had been anticipated by Thorp and
Kassouf (MacKenzie 2008, pp. 130–131).
Simultaneously, Robert C. Merton, who had studied
advanced engineering mathematics before becoming a
student of Paul Samuelson, was considering the problem of
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pricing warrants from a different perspective. Samuelson
had never accepted Markowitz’s criterion of trading the
expected returns of a portfolio against the variance of
returns (Samuelson 1970), which was a foundation of
CAPM and Scholes’ work, so Merton tackled the problem
of valuing warrants by maximising expected utility
employing the stochastic calculus that had become
important in aeronautical and electronic engineering. This
work was published in 1969 (Samuelson 1969; Merton
1969).
Despite the fact that Black never liked Merton’s highly
mathematical technique, Scholes discussed their work with
Merton in 1970. Merton saw how the Black–Scholes
approach of hedging could be incorporated into his own
continuous time models, removing the need to employ an
arbitrary utility function in solving the pricing problem.
Merton showed that a portfolio made up of: a single war-
rant, or an option; a hedging position in the risky under-
lying asset; and a funding position in the riskless bank
account, would offer the same, certain, return as the initial
cost of the portfolio deposited in the riskless bank account.
It seemed that both subjectivity and risk had been removed
from the pricing problem.
In October 1970 Black and Scholes submitted their work
to the Journal of Political Economy and then the Review of
Economics and Statistics, but it was rejected without
review, on the basis that there was not enough economics
in it. The paper was only published by the Journal of
Political Economy (Black and Scholes 1973) after the
intervention of influential academics and shortly after the
opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (Bern-
stein 1998, pp. 314–315; MacKenzie 2008, pp. 133–136).
Merton published his approach almost simultaneously
(Merton 1973).
When BSM was being developed option pricing was a
relatively unimportant activity. Gambling legislation in the
United States meant that options were only traded on
‘deliverable’ assets, principally agricultural commodities,
and these markets were stagnant (MacKenzie 2008,
pp. 142–145). However, following the ‘Nixon Shock’ of
August 1971, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates collapsed and in the aftermath, interest rates,
exchange rates and commodity prices became much more
volatile. Options, which have been a feature of financial
practice since the seventeenth century and were widely
traded before the suspension of the European financial
markets during the First World War (Nelson 1904), re-
emerged as a tool to insure against volatile asset prices.
Despite the financial rational for options, their legiti-
macy with regard to gambling legislation was still ambig-
uous. The introduction of BSM delivered a mathematical
equation that defined the price of an option in terms of
known, in the sense of statistically certain, parameters
making their valuation appear deterministic. Trading in
options could not be gambling, given that there was no
speculation in their valuation. Donald MacKenzie reports
the view of the legal counsel to the Chicago Board of Trade
at the time, Burton Rissman
Black–Scholes was what really enabled the exchange
to thrive …we were faced in the late 60s—early 70s
with the issue of gambling. That fell away, and I
think Black–Scholes made it fall away. It wasn’t
speculation or gambling it was efficient pricing.
(MacKenzie 2008, p. 158)
Both the Black–Scholes and Merton approaches to pricing
options involved heuristic arguments, they were ‘engineer-
ing solutions’. Harrison sought to establish a rigorous
option pricing ‘theory’ to support the range of mathemat-
ical models developed on the back of the explosion in
derivatives markets (MacKenzie 2008, pp. 140–141). Har-
rison, and his colleagues, were successful in their mission
and opened finance to investigation by pure mathemati-
cians (e.g. Schachermayer 1984; Delbaen and Schach-
ermayer 1994; Delbaen and Schachermayer 1998) and by
2000, any mathematician working on asset pricing would
do so within the context of the FTAP.
The FTAP is not well known outside the academic field
of financial mathematics. Practitioners focus on the models
that are a consequence of the Theorem while social sci-
entists focus on the original Black–Scholes–Merton
approach as an exemplar. Even before the market crash of
1987 practitioners were sceptical as to the validity of the
prices produced by their models (Miyazaki 2007,
pp. 409–410; MacKenzie 2008, p. 248; Haug and Taleb
2011) and today the original Black–Scholes equation is
used to measure market volatility, a proxy for uncertainty,
rather than to ‘price’ options.
However, the status of the Black–Scholes model as an
exemplar in financial economics has been enhanced fol-
lowing the development of the FTAP. Significantly, the
theorem unifies different approaches in financial econom-
ics. The clearest example of this synthesis was that in the
course of the development of the FTAP it was observed
that a mathematical object, the Radon–Nikodym deriva-
tive, which is related to the stochastic calculus Merton
employed, involved the market-price of risk (Sharpe ratio),
a key object in CAPM that Black used. Without the FTAP
the two approaches are incongruous (MacKenzie 2003a,
p 834). Overall, as will be discussed in full in the next
section, the FTAP brings together: Merton’s approach
employing stochastic calculus advocated by Samuelson;
CAPM, developed by Treynor and Sharpe; martingales, a
mathematical concept employed by Fama in the develop-
ment of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis; and the idea of
incomplete markets, introduced by Arrow and Debreu.
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The synthesis by the FTAP of a ‘constellation of beliefs,
values, techniques’ represented a Kuhnian paradigm for
financial economics focused on the Black–Scholes–Merton
approach to pricing options. To paraphrase Tait
A mathematical proposition is about a certain struc-
ture, financial markets. It refers to prices and relations
among them. If it is true, it is so in virtue of a certain
fact about this structure. And this fact may obtain
even if we do not or cannot know that it does. (Tait
1986, p 341)
In this sense, the FTAP confirmed the ‘truth’ of many of
the core concepts of financial economics in the mid 1990s.
An Ethical Analysis of the FTAP
The FTAP is a theorem of mathematics, and the use of the
term ‘measure’ in its statement places the FTAP within the
theory of probability formulated by Kolmogorov in 1933
(1956). Kolmogorov’s work took place in a context cap-
tured by Bertrand Russell, who in 1927 observed that
It is important to realise the fundamental position of
probability in science. …As to what is meant by
probability, opinions differ. (Russell 1927 (2009,
p. 301)
In the 1920s the idea of randomness, as distinct from a lack
of information, was becoming substantive in the physical
sciences (Hacking 1990, p. 1; von Plato 1994,
pp. 147–157). In the social sciences, Frank Knight argued
that uncertainty was the only source of profit (Knight 1921
(2006, III.VII.1–4) and the concept was pervading John
Maynard Keynes’ economics (Mizuhara and Runde 2004;
Skidelsky 2009, pp. 84–88).
Two mathematical theories of probability had become
ascendant by the late 1920s. Richard von Mises (brother of
the Austrian economist Ludwig) von Mises (1957)
attempted to lay down the axioms of classical probability
within a framework of logical positivism, the ‘frequentist’
or ‘objective’ approach. To counter-balance von Mises, the
Italian actuary Bruno de Finetti presented a very different
approach, characterised by his claim that ‘‘Probability does
not exist’’ because it was only an expression of the
observer’s view of the world. This ‘subjectivist’ approach
was closely related to the position taken by Frank Ramsey
who developed an argument against Keynes’ interpretation
of probability presented in the Treatise on Probability
(Ramsey 1931; Ramsey and Mellor 1980; Davis 2004;
Edgington 2012).
Kolmogorov addressed the diversity of mathematical
probability by generalising so that all were examples of
abstract ‘measures’ satisfying certain axioms. In doing this,
a random variable became a function while an expectation
was an integral: probability became a branch of Analysis,
not Statistics.
Von Mises criticised Kolmogorov’s generalised frame-
work as un-necessarily complex (von Mises 1957, p. 99)
while the statistician Maurice Kendall argued that abstract
measure theory failed ‘‘to found a theory of probability as a
branch of scientific method’’ (Kendall 1949, p. 102). More
recently the physicist Edwin Jaynes champions Leonard
Savage’s subjectivist Bayesianism as having a ‘‘deeper
conceptual foundation which allows it to be extended to a
wider class of applications, required by current problems of
science’’ (Jaynes 2003, p. 655).
The objections to measure theoretic probability for
empirical scientists can be accounted for as a lack of
physicality. Frequentist probability is based on the act of
counting; subjectivist probability is based on a flow of
information, which following Claude Shannon, is now an
observable entity in empirical science. Measure theoretic
probability is based on abstract mathematical objects
unrelated to sensible phenomena. However, the generality
of Kolmogorov’s approach made it flexible enough to
handle problems that emerged in physics and engineering
during the Second World War and his approach became
widely accepted after 1950 because it was practically
useful.
In the context of the first statement of the FTAP, a
‘martingale measure’ can be understood as a probability
measure, usually labelled Q, such that the (real, rather than
nominal) price of an asset today, X0, is the expectation,
using the martingale measure, of its (real) price in the
future, XT . Formally,
X0 ¼ EQ½XT :
The abstract probability distribution Q is defined so that
this equality exists, not on any empirical information of
historical prices or subjective judgement of future prices.
The only condition placed on the relationship that the
martingale measure has with the ‘natural’, or ‘empirical’,
probability measures, usually assigned the label P, is that
they agree on what is possible.
The term ‘martingale’ in this context derives from
doubling strategies in gambling and it was introduced into
mathematics by Jean Ville in a development of von Mises
work. The idea that asset prices have the martingale
property was first proposed by Mandelbrot (1966) in
response to an early formulation of Eugene Fama’s Effi-
cient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama 1965), the two
concepts being combined by Fama (1970). For Mandelbrot
and Fama the key consequence of prices being martingales
was that the current price was independent of the future
price and technical analysis would not prove profitable in
the long run. In developing the EMH there was no dis-
cussion on the nature of the probability under which assets
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are martingales, and it is often assumed that the expectation
is calculated under the natural measure. While the FTAP
employs modern terminology in the context of positivist
economic value-neutrality, the idea of equating a current
price with a future, uncertain, payoff would have been
understood by Olivi and obvious to Huygens, both working
in an explicitly ethical framework.
The other technical term in the first statement of the
FTAP, arbitrage, has long been used in financial mathe-
matics. In Chapter 9 of the Liber Abaci Fibonacci discusses
‘Barter of Merchandise and Similar Things’,
20 arms of cloth are worth 3 Pisan pounds and 42
rolls of cotton are similarly worth 5 Pisan pounds; it
is sought how many rolls of cotton will be had for 50
arms of cloth. (Fibonacci and Sigler 2003, p. 180)
In this case there are three commodities, arms of cloth, rolls
of cotton and Pisan pounds, and Fibonacci solves the
problem by having Pisan pounds ‘arbitrate’, or ‘mediate’ as
Aristotle might say, between the other two commodities.
Over the centuries this technique of pricing through
arbitration evolved into the Law of One Price: if two
assets offer identical cash flows then they must have the
same price. This was employed by Jan de Witt in 1671
when he solved the problem of pricing life annuities in
terms of redeemable annuities, based on the presumption
that
the real value of certain expectations or chances of
objects, of different value, should be estimated by
that which we can obtain from as many expectations
or chances dependent on one or several equitable
contracts. (Sylla 2003, p. 313, quoting De Witt)
In 1908 Vincent Bronzin published a text which discusses
pricing derivatives by ‘covering’, or hedging, them with
portfolios of options and forward contracts employing the
principle of ‘equivalence’ (Zimmermann and Hafner
2007). In 1965 the mathematicians, Edward Thorp and
Sheen Kassouf, combined the Law of One Price with basic
techniques of calculus to identify market mispricing of
warrant prices and in 1967 they published their method-
ology in a best-selling book, Beat the Market.
Within neo-classical economics, the Law of One Price
was developed in a series of papers between 1954 and 1964
by Kenneth Arrow, Ge´rard Debreu and Lionel MacKenzie
in the context of general equilibrium, in particular the
introduction of the Arrow Security, which, employing the
Law of One Price, could be used to price any asset (Arrow
1964). It was on this principle that Black and Scholes
believed the value of the warrants could be deduced by
employing a hedging portfolio. By introducing their work
with the statement that ‘‘it should not be possible to make
sure profits’’ (Black and Scholes 1973) they were invoking
the arbitrage argument, which had an eight hundred year
history.
In the context of the FTAP, ‘an arbitrage’ has developed
into the ability to formulate a trading strategy such that the
probability, under a natural or martingale measure, of a loss
is zero, but the probability of a positive profit is not. This
definition is important following Hardie’s criticism of the
way the term is applied loosely in economic sociology, and
elsewhere (Hardie 2004). The important point of this def-
inition is that, unlike Hardie’s definition (Hardie 2004,
p. 243), there is no guaranteed (strictly positive) profit.
To understand the connection between the financial
concept of arbitrage and the mathematical idea of a mar-
tingale measure, consider the most basic case of a single
asset whose current price, X0, can take on one of two
(present) values, XDT\X
U
T , at time T [ 0, in the future. In
this case an arbitrage would exist if X0XDT \XUT : buying
the asset now, at a price that is less than or equal to the
future pay-offs, would lead to a possible profit at the end of
the period, with the guarantee of no loss. Similarly, if
XDT \X
U
T X0, short selling the asset now, and buying it
back would also lead to an arbitrage. So, for there to be no




This implies that there is a number, 0\q\1, such that
X0 ¼ XDT þ q ðXUT  XDT Þ ¼ q XUT þ ð1 qÞXDT :
The price now, X0, lies between the future prices, X
U
T and
XDT , in the ratio q : ð1 qÞ and represents some sort of
‘average’. The first statement of the FTAP can be inter-
preted simply as ‘‘the price of an asset must lie between its
maximum and minimum possible (real) future price’’.
If X0\XDT  XUT we have that q\0 where as if
XDT XUT \X0 then q[ 1, and in both cases q does not
represent a probability measure which by Kolmogorov’s
axioms, must lie between 0 and 1. In either of these cases
an arbitrage exists and a trader can make a riskless profit,
the market involves ‘turpe lucrum’. This account gives an
insight as to why James Bernoulli, in his moral approach to
probability, considered situations where probabilities did
not sum to 1, he was considering problems that were
pathological not because they failed the rules of arithmetic
but because they were unfair.
It follows that if there are no arbitrage opportunities then
quantity q can be seen as representing the ‘probability’ that
the XUT price will materialise in the future. Formally






The connection between the financial concept of arbitrage
and the mathematical object of a martingale is essentially a
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tautology: both statements mean that the price today of an
asset must lie between its future minimum and maximum
possible value.
This first statement of the FTAP was anticipated by
Ramsey in 1926 when he defined ‘probability’ in the sense
of ‘a degree of belief’ and argued that a standard way of
measuring ‘degrees of belief’ is through betting odds
(Ramsey 1931, p. 171). On this basis he formulates some
axioms of probability, including that a probability must lie
between 0 and 1 (Ramsey 1931, p. 181). He then goes on to
say that
These are the laws of probability, ...If anyone’s
mental condition violated these laws, his choice
would depend on the precise form in which the
options were offered him, which would be absurd. He
could have a book made against him by a cunning
better and would then stand to lose in any event.
(Ramsey 1931, p. 182)
This is a concrete practical argument, rather than an
abstract theoretical one, that identifies the absence of the
martingale measure with the existence of arbitrage and
today it forms the basis of the standard argument as to why
arbitrages do not exist: if they did the, other market par-
ticipants would bankrupt the agent who was mispricing the
asset. This has become known in philosophy as the ‘Dutch
Book’ argument and, as a consequence of the value-neu-
trality that dominates modern science, is often presented as
a ‘matter of fact’. However, if we ignore value-neutrality
and accept that probability has an ethical dimension then
the Dutch book argument is an alternative of the ‘Golden
Rule’—‘‘Do to others as you would have them do to
you.’’—it is infused with the moral concepts of fairness and
reciprocity (Wattles 1996; Ha´jek 2008).
Ramsey goes on to make an important point
Having any definite degree of belief implies a certain
measure of consistency, namely willingness to bet on
a given proposition at the same odds for any stake,
the stakes being measured in terms of ultimate values.
Having degrees of belief obeying the laws of proba-
bility implies a further measure of consistency,
namely such a consistency between the odds
acceptable on different propositions as shall prevent a
book being made against you. (Ramsey 1931,
pp. 182–183)
Ramsey is arguing that an agent needs to employ the same
measure in pricing all assets in a market, and this is the key
result in contemporary derivative pricing. Having identified
the martingale measure on the basis of a ‘primal’ asset, it is
then applied across the market, in particular to derivatives
on the primal asset but the well-known result that if two
assets offer different ‘market prices of risk’, an arbitrage
exists. This explains why the market-price of risk appears
in the Radon–Nikodym derivative and the Capital Market
Line, it enforces Ramsey’s consistency in pricing.
The second statement of the FTAP is concerned with
incomplete markets, which appear in relation to Arrow-
Debreu prices. In mathematics, in the special case that
there are as many, or more, assets in a market as there are
possible future, uncertain, states, a unique pricing vector
can be deduced for the market because of Cramer’s Rule. If
the elements of the pricing vector satisfy the axioms of
probability, specifically each element is positive and they
all sum to one, then the market precludes arbitrage
opportunities. This is the case covered by the first state-
ment of the FTAP.
In the more realistic situation that there are more pos-
sible future states than assets, the market can still be
arbitrage free but the pricing vector, the martingale mea-
sure, might not be unique. An agent should still be con-
sistent in selecting which particular martingale measure
they choose to use, but another agent might choose a dif-
ferent measure, such that the two do not agree on a price. In
the context of the Law of One Price, this means that we
cannot hedge, replicate or cover, a position in the market,
such that the portfolio is riskless. The significance of the
second statement of the FTAP is that it tells us that in the
sensible world of imperfect knowledge and transaction
costs, a model within the framework of the FTAP cannot
give a precise price. When faced with incompleteness in
markets, agents need alternative ways to price assets and
behavioural techniques have come to dominate financial
theory. This feature was realised in The Port Royal Logic
when it recognised the role of transaction costs in lotteries.
The Dialectic of Enlightenment
We present the case that the subsistence of the FTAP is
reciprocity, alternatively Justice characterised by equality
in exchange, colloquially fairness. The pre-history of
mathematical probability lies in Olivi’s examination of
commercial exchange in the context of Aristotle’s Ethics.
The formal introduction of mathematical probability in the
seventeenth century is in the ethical analysis of commercial
contracts in the context of ‘fair’ pricing. However, during
the nineteenth century the moral injunction not to engage
in turpe lucrum, through the practice of arbitrage, becomes
highly technical, and ethically neutral. In the process the
essence of reciprocity in the FTAP becomes obscured. This
immediately raises the question as to why, or how, did the
association disappear in the nineteenth century.
The idea that commerce improved society was prevalent
throughout the eighteenth century in the doux-commerce
thesis. A 1704 technical text on commerce argues ‘‘Com-
merce attaches [men] to one another throughmutual utility’’;
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while in The Rights of Man (1792) Thomas Paine writes
‘‘commerce is a pacific system, operating to cordialise
mankind’’. In the intervening years Montesquieu, Hume,
Condorcet and Adam Smith all agreed that commerce was a
powerful civilising agent, promoting honesty, industrious-
ness, probity, punctuality, and frugality, in contrast to the
excesses of absolute monarchies of the preceding centuries
(Hirschman 1982; Fourcade and Healy 2007).
Adam Smith argues, in An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), that humans are
distinctive from other animals in the degree to which they
are co-operative
Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate
exchange of one bone for another with another dog.
[Smith 1776 (2012, Book 1, Chap. 2)]
Humans, on the other hand, exhibit
the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one
thing for another. [Smith 1776 (2012, Book 1,
Chap. 2)]
Following the Industrial Revolution, these attitudes all but
disappeared and were replaced by views that blamed a
collapse of morality on the influence of commerce that was
seen as commodifying human interaction; ‘‘custom is
replaced by contract’. We suggest that an explanation for
this change in attitude is provided by the argument
presented by Adorno and Horkenheimer in Dialectic of
Enlightenment (1944). The Dialetic claims that the
Enlightenment led to the objectification of nature and its
mathematisation, which in turn leads to ‘instrumental
mindsets’ that seek to optimally achieve predetermined
ends in the context of an underlying need to control
external events.
Central to this process for our argument is Laplace’s
treatment of probability, Analytic Theory of Probability
(1812). Laplace can be seen as resolving the problem of
uncertainty in science by building on the conception of
probability introduced by Montmort and de Moivre, which
were developed in to context of fixed odds games of chance
rather than commerce. Laplace showed that while experi-
mental results were ‘random’ in the sense that they were
not precise, mathematics could be employed to determine
the validity of the average of a set of well conducted
experiments. Out of uncertainty emerges clarity. Laplace
had a profound effect on all the sciences, Quetelet built
social physics on his results, while Galton introduced them
into the natural sciences leading to the work of Fisher and
Pearson. Laplace’s conception of probability as a statistical
result still dominates how the field is approached today and
is the basis of much of the criticism of measure theoretic
probability we have encountered.
Contemporary with Laplace, Thomas Malthus captured
the anxiety of the English gentry following the French
Revolution in An Essay on the Principle of Population that
focused on scarcity. In 1836 John Stuart Mill defined
political economy as being
concerned with [man] solely as a being who desires
to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of
the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that
end. (Mill 1967)
Mill defended Malthus in Principles of Political Economy
of 1848, written at a time when Europe was struck by the
Cholera pandemic of 1829–1851 and the famines of
1845–1851 and Tennyson was describing nature as ‘‘red
in tooth and claw’’. Herbert Spencer coined the term
‘survival of the fittest’ in Principles of Biology (1864) after
reading Darwin, who in 1871 would write
My object in this chapter is to shew that there is no
fundamental difference between man and the higher
mammals in their mental faculties. (Darwin 1871,
p. 36)
less than a century after Smith had claimed there was a
fundamental difference. Alfred Marshall synthesised Mill’s
approach to economics with Darwinian metaphors of
competition (Backhouse 1985, 10.1; Thomas 1991) to lay
the foundations of neo-classical economics. Marshall’s
1890 definition of economics would be paired down by
Lionel Robbins in 1932 as ‘‘the science which studies
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have alternative uses’’.
The simultaneous ebb away of concern for uncertainty
and flow of anxiety around scarcity bring to mind Moses
ben Maimon (Maimonides) who argued in Guide for the
Perplexed (c. 1190) that God’s punishment after the Fall of
Man was not so much about scarcity but uncertainty. In the
Garden of Eden humans had perfect knowledge, which was
lost with the Fall, and it is the loss of this knowledge which
is at the root of suffering: if we know what will happen we
can manage scarcity (Perlman 1997). Laplace had showed
how modern science could generalise and predict in the
face of uncertainty. The consequence of this was that
economics focused its inquiry on competition in the face of
scarcity with the emphasis being in identifying mathe-
matical methods to optimise, essentially deterministic,
expectations.
A Pragmatic Approach to Commerce
Both Alasdair MacIntyre (2013) and Cheryl Misak (2002)
are concerned with the problem that contemporary
56 T. C. Johnson
123
philosophy struggles to assert what is right behaviour.
Misak is interested in asserting that cooperation is prefer-
able to authoritarianism (Misak 2002, esp. Chap. 1),
MacIntyre is concerned with a related problem that there is
a risk that what is right comes down to what the powerful
(or wilful) claim is right (MacIntyre 2013, esp. Chap. 9).
The relevance of these concerns to finance are demon-
strated in the crisis related to LIBOR manipulation. LIBOR
sets the benchmark interest rate used by financial institu-
tions; if the LIBOR rate is high lenders benefit at the
expense of borrowers. The consequences of manipulating
the LIBOR rate upwards clearly impacts the public, hold-
ing mortgages or student loans, and will appear to benefit
financial institutions. However, in many of the recent cases
LIBOR was being manipulated down, reducing the cost of
loans and it has been argued that there was a consequential
societal benefit of manipulation in this case. One reason
why LIBOR was being under-reported, other than profit
generation, was to hide market concerns as to the credit-
worthiness of major financial institutions and it has been
claimed that this was beneficial in maintaining the financial
system at a time of stress (Kaminska 2012). LIBOR
manipulation is usually explained as being dubious on the
grounds that it distorts trust in the market, but ‘trust’ is
intangible and such arguments could succumb to more
tangible, utilitarian, cases for LIBOR manipulation. We
appear to lack a philosophical framework that can explain
clearly why LIBOR manipulation is intolerable.
The US Department of Justice has highlighted how
‘‘LIBOR manipulation was pervasive’’ in some institutions
and they
are concerned that too many bank employees and
supervisors value coming as close to the line as pos-
sible, or even crossing the line, as being ‘‘competitive’’
or ‘‘aggressive’’. Too many seem to be willing to take
advantage of any edge—including those of dubious
legality—to make money. (Cole 2013)
This highlights a problem with the current financial
regulatory system. Firms are guided by a consequentialist
ethic that seeks to enhance human welfare by generating
profits. These activities are constrained by a deontological
ethic that lays down boundaries. The US authorities can
prosecute firms involved in LIBOR manipulation because
LIBOR rates are instrumental in pricing derivatives, and
the manipulation of the derivatives markets is illegal in the
US. In the UK, LIBOR manipulation does not appear to
have been illegal. This highlights an issue with the ‘carrot
and stick’ regulation: the regulator must have foresight of
what practices or technologies might emerge that need
proscribing. For example, the growth of High Frequency
Trading has been accompanied by practices that are
considered dubious but outside legislation. The regulatory
framework must be capable of looking into an uncertain
future, something it does not appear to be at present.
In this section, having made the claim that reciprocity is a
foundation of financial economics, we endeavour to robustly
justify our claim and provide an explanatory hypothesis that
would act as the foundation of a regulatory framework that
unequivocally condemns market manipulation.
Is it True that Reciprocity is a Foundation of Financial
Economics?
Rubin’s discussions of emporiophobia raise an important
issue discussed in the Introduction. If the claim that reci-
procity is a foundation of financial economics is simply a
heuristic in support of the cooperation metaphor there is no
reason why economic agents should behave cooperatively
and direct their activities in support of social cohesion. If,
on the other hand, it is true to say that reciprocity is a key
foundation of financial economics the implication is that
financial economics intrinsically supports social cohesion.
To appreciate this point, recall that in ‘‘The Emergence of
Probability’’ section we argue that the genesis of mathe-
matical probability is in Book V of Nicomachean Ethics, a
text that addresses how an individual can live as part of a
community and directly addresses the issue of social
cohesion, while in ‘‘The Fundamental Theorem of Asset
Pricing’’ section we argue that FTAP has these principles
embedded within it.
Susan Haack provides us with the metaphor of knowl-
edge as a crossword puzzle; in this sense our claim is the
solution to a single clue whose validity can be assessed by
comparing it to overlapping clues. We shall now consider
some of these overlapping ideas in order to explore the
robustness of our claim.
The FTAP is usually explained in a competitive context
involving the Dutch book argument: if you priced allowing
for an arbitrage a competitor would be able to act against
you making a risk-less profit that would bankrupt you. The
conventional explanation for the FTAP is that the objec-
tive, ‘physical process’, of hedging ensures there is no
arbitrage. This argument only applies in the special cir-
cumstance of a market-maker, obliged to simultaneously
give and take prices; it does not apply to market exchange
in general. The problem with this heuristic is that, even for
market-makers, it does not always hold. This is captured by
Rama Cont and Peter Tankov when addressing pricing in
markets with discontinuous prices
Unless the martingale measure is a by-product of a
hedging approach, the price given by such martingale
measures is not related to the cost of a hedging
strategy therefore the meaning of such ‘prices’ is not
clear. (Cont and Tankov 2004, 10.5.2)
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Mathematically, the martingale measure exists, as Cont and
Tankov had shown, but in the markets they studied the
hedging argument cannot be employed. So the whole
heuristic is very narrow and there is no conceptual
framework supporting the prices obtained from the FTAP.
In the circumstances studied by Cont and Tankov, at least,
we need a better heuristic, or explanatory metaphor, than
the current one. We argue that reciprocity is the basis of a
better heuristic.
In fact, we reject the view that we are dealing only with a
metaphor or a heuristic on the basis that the results of the
Ultimatum Game. The ‘Ultimatum Game’ is an important
anomaly for neo-classical economics (Thaler 1988) and is a
topic of significant contemporary interest in economics,
anthropology, evolutionary biology and cognitive sciences.
It involves two participants and a sum of money. The first
player proposes how to share the money with the second
participant. The division is made only if the second partici-
pant accepts the split, if the first player’s proposal is rejected
neither participant receives anything. The key result is that if
the money is not split ‘fairly’ (approximately equally) then
the second player rejects the offer. This contradicts the
assumption that people are rational utility maximising
agents, since if they were the second player would accept any
positive payment. Research has shown that chimpanzees are
rational maximisers while the willingness of the second
player to accept an offer is dependent on age and culture.
Older people from societies where exchange plays a signif-
icant role are more likely to demand a fairer split of the pot
than young children or adults from isolated communities
(Murnighan and Saxon 1998; Henrich et al. 2004, 2006;
Jensen et al. 2007). Fair exchange appears to be learnt
behaviour developed in a social context of commercial
exchange, is fundamental to human society and distinguishes
the sapient member of a civitas from the sentient animals
(Henrich et al. 2004; Humphrey 1985; Fehr and Henrich
2003). Adam Smith was more accurate that Charles Darwin.
The evidence from the Ultimatum Game suggests that
reciprocity, and fairness, upon which cooperation is built is
an important norm beyond societies that have a relationship
to Aristotelian ethics, which include Judaic, Christian and
Islamic cultures. Unrecognised by Rawls, it is significant
beyond liberal democracies. With this observation in mind
we highlight Robert Brandom’s position, built on Witt-
genstein, that there is
a pragmatist conception of norms—a notion of
primitive correctnesses of performance implicit in
practice that precludes and are presupposed by their
explicit formulation in rules and principles. (Bran-
dom 1994, p. 21)
Our account is that the ‘primitive correctnesses’ of the
norm of reciprocity is implicit in commercial practices and
was recognised by Aristotle when he investigated the
nature of Justice in the context of exchange and that the
norm is required to ensure social cohesion—Aristotle
argued it ‘‘keeps the city together’’ (Broadie and Rowe
2011, 1132b34).
Despite the evidence of the Ultimatum Game, one could
argue that the cross-cultural significance of reciprocity is
not necessarily the correct basis for financial economics.
Specifically, we have assumed that reciprocity is present
because cooperation is the objective. It might turn out that
this is a misguided objective, and that competition does
lead to better outcomes for society. This question is of
significance beyond finance and economics and we can
start employing arguments in political philosophy in favour
of democratic cooperation over competitive authoritarian-
ism, such as Misak (2002). Misak argues that we can only
be sure of the validity of our beliefs by putting them up for
criticism and offering reasons to justify them. This is an
epistemic argument that Misak claims justifies democracy:
if in politics we seek the best policy we must allow our
decisions to be challenged and be in a position to defend
the decisions without resorting to authority; this requires
that we are cooperative. Misak enables us to identify an
incoherence in the thesis that the foundation of financial
economics is competition: the argument is created out of a
cooperative principle (in science) but concludes that a
competitive ethic is preferable (in finance).
Misak’s argument creates a link between political phi-
losophy and epistemology: it connects democracies to sci-
ence (Misak 2002, p. 94). The argument we develop in ‘‘The
Emergence of Probability’’ section comes out of Borkenau’s
The Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World View
(1934) that argues modern science emerges out of the capi-
talist system: a connection between science and commerce.
Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy point out that doux-
commerce argues that ‘‘[c]ommerce teaches ethics mainly
through its communicative dimension, that is, by promoting
conversations among equals and exchange between strang-
ers.’’ (Fourcade and Healy 2007, p. 287): a connection
between commerce and democracies. We appear to have a
triad consisting of markets, science and democracy con-
nected by the requirement to test the validity of our ideas by
putting them up for criticism and then defending them.
An Explanatory Hypothesis
In the triad, markets are anterior to both science and
democracy. We offer an explanation for this observation:
markets are centres of communicative action. Moreover,
because markets are fast-moving, time is compressed and
practices evolve rapidly, metaphorically they are uncon-
scious social research laboratories where the practices of
communicative action are refined.
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The term ‘communicative action’ was coined by Ju¨rgen
Habermas as he sought to develop a more optimistic
assessment of the Enlightenment than that presented by
Adorno and Horkeheimer in The Dialectic of the Enlight-
enment. In Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
Habermas argues that during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries public spaces emerged, the public sphere,
which facilitated rational discussion that sought the truth in
support of the public good. In the nineteenth century, mass
circulation mechanisms came to dominate the public
sphere and these were controlled by private interests. As a
consequence, the public became consumers of news and
information rather than creators of a consensus through
engagement with information. Having undertaken this
analysis of the contemporary state of affairs, Habermas
sought to describe how the ideal of the Enlightenment
public sphere could be enacted in the more complex con-
temporary (pre-internet) society and his Theory of Com-
municative Action is the result.
Central to Communicative Action is a rejection of the
dominant philosophical paradigm, the ‘philosophy of
consciousness’, that is rooted in Cartesian dualism; the
separation of mind-body, subject-object, concepts and is
characterised by Foundationalism; philosophy is required
in order to demonstrate the validity of science and the
validity of science is based on empiricism, and certain
views specific to the social sciences; such as that society is
based on individuals (atoms) interacting, so that society is
posterior to individuals and that society (a material,
extending the physical metaphor) can be studied as a uni-
tary whole, not as an aggregate of individuals.
This dominant paradigm sees language as being made
up of statements that are either true or false and complex
statements are valid if they can be deduced from true
primitive statements. This approach is exemplified in the
standard mathematical technique of axiom-theorem-proof.
Habermas replaces this paradigm with one that rests on a
Pragmatic theory of meaning that shifts the focus from
what language says (true or false) to what it does. Specif-
ically, Habermas sees the function of language as being to
enable different people to come to a shared understanding
and achieve a consensus, this is defined as discourse.
Because discourse is based on making a claim, the claim
being challenged and then justified, discourse needs to be
governed by rules, or norms. The most basic rules are
logical and semantic, on top of these are norms governing
procedure, such as sincerity and accountability, and finally
there are norms to ensure that discourse is not subject to
coercion or skewed by inequality.
There is an Asian description of a market as ‘‘Two
women and a duck’’ and the essence of the proverb is that if
two women, who are characterised as talkative, and a duck
come together, eventually the value of the duck will be
determined—knowledge is created. More generally, the
market mechanism requires that two agents agree the price
of an asset. If the price is determined by a single unit we
have a non-market mechanism involving a private
monopoly or state intervention. These examples in the
context of the preceding discussion justify our claim that
markets are centres of communicative action that aim to
achieve consensus on the price of assets.
This claim has some technical implications. Firstly,
market discourse is a specific type of discourse that would
depend on particular norms of discourse. We propose that
reciprocity is a key norm of market discourse that is
required to ensure impartiality, as Aristotle observes
(Broadie and Rowe 2011, p. 35). Another norm that
appears to have been important in market discourse is
‘charity’. This seems peculiar in the contemporary setting
and the common interpretation of charity as altruistic
giving, which is at odds with reciprocity, rather than the
traditional definition as care for others (‘benevolence’
would be a better contemporary alternative). However, it is
worth noting that one reading of Shakespeare’s The Mer-
chant of Venice is as of a study of the four natures of
classical love, with Antonio, ‘the merchant of Venice’
characterising charity (caritas/agape). More practically,
British finance rests on foundations laid by Quaker insti-
tutions, reflected in the names of Barclays, Lloyds, Wa-
terhouse, and Coopers. The financial success of these
Quaker families was built on a reputation for honesty and
sincerity, a strong social network built on democratic
principles and a tradition for open discourse (Walvin
1998). Above all, a Quaker banker needed to conform to
religions precepts that included charity and is captured in
the proverb
‘‘Well, Friend’’, said the Quaker Banker, ‘‘Tell me
the answers to these questions so that I may help you
in your projects, for you have opportunities: Firstly,
how much do you seek to borrow? For how long?
And how will you repay the loan plus its interest?’’
These are the issues all good bankers must explore.
(my emphasis)
The second implication concerns the role of mathematics in
finance. Mathematics is widely regarded as delivering
indubitable results, and on this basis a price derived
mathematically has authority. However, in the context of
communicative action, language is not a truth carrier but
rather it is a linguistic device to enable the transmission of
understanding. This is the role of Fibonacci’s mathematics
in medieval finance, highlighted by Sigler (Fibonacci and
Sigler 2003, Introduction); it enabled a calculation to be
written down that could then be copied, modified and
improved by others. In not recognising this role for
mathematics, financial economics has been perceived by
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many as being capable of delivering accurate asset prices in
the face of radical uncertainty. The Black–Scholes pricing
formula was once claimed to be the most successful
equation in economics (Ross 1987, p. 332).
However since Black Monday in 1987 market practi-
tioners have been more sceptical of the accuracy of the
Black–Scholes equation, and as Haug and Taleb (2011)
point out, traders rarely use the formula and prefer practical
heuristics. In contemporary markets, the prices of standard,
exchange traded derivatives are determined by ‘the mar-
ket’, while exotic, over-the-counter derivatives are too
complex to be priced analytically. Donald MacKenzie
observes that, in practice, financial economics provides ‘‘a
benchmark ‘fair’ price that facilitates negotiation’’ (Mac-
Kenzie 2008, p. 257, my emphasis). Problems that Mac-
Kenzie has investigated: the super-portfolio in relation to
the failure of Long Term Capital Management (MacKenzie
2003b); and the choice of 0.3 as the correlation parameter
used in pricing CDOs in the lead up to the Credit Crisis
(MacKenzie 2011) are both problems of a monism related
to a belief in the indubitability of mathematics. Replacing
the negotiation between market agents with an algorithm
that delivers a theoretical price replaces ‘knowledge’,
generated through communication, with dogma. This is an
almost trivial observation to (successful) market partici-
pants (e.g. Tett 2009; Beunza and Stark 2012; Duhon 2012,
especially Chap. 12).
Gabrielle and Reuven Brenner identify ‘speculators’ as
market participants that bet on a miscalculation of the odds
quoted by the market and the reason why speculators are
regarded as socially questionable is that they have opinions
that are explicitly at odds with the consensus (Brenner and
Brenner 1990, p. 91; Beunza and Stark 2012, p. 394). A
good description of the process that speculators are
involved in is given by Beunza and Stark (2012), which
clearly explains how mathematics is just one method of
testing the validity of a trader’s intuition.
Rather than seeing traders as seeking a profit in a
competitive arena, we can see traders as seeking the truth
in the face of market uncertainty; in offering a price they
are making a claim. William James recognised this asso-
ciation when he uses a financial metaphor to explain
Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth
Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit
system. Our thoughts and beliefs ‘pass,’ so long as
nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so
long as nobody refuses them. But this all points to
direct face-to-face verifications somewhere, without
which the fabric of truth collapses like a financial
system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept my
verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade
on each other’s truth. But beliefs verified concretely
by SOMEBODY are the posts of the whole super-
structure. (James 2010, p. 80)
Arjun Appadurai offers another perspective on the behav-
iour of traders in the face of market uncertainty with the
observation that speculators
believe in their capacity to channel the workings of
chance to win in the games dominated by cultures of
control …[they] are not those who wish to ‘‘tame
chance’’ but those who wish to use chance to animate
the otherwise deterministic play of risk [quantifiable
uncertainty]’’. (Appadurai 2011, pp. 533–534)
Appadurai was motivated to study finance by Marcel
Mauss’ essay Le Don (‘The Gift’), exploring the moral
force behind reciprocity in primitive and archaic societies
and goes on to say that the contemporary financial
speculator is ‘‘betting on the obligation of return’’
(Appadurai 2011, p. 535), and this is the fundamental
axiom of contemporary finance. David Graeber also
recognises the fundamental position reciprocity has in
finance (Graeber 2011), but where as Appadurai recognises
the importance of reciprocity in the presence of uncer-
tainty, Graeber essentially ignores uncertainty in his
analysis that ends with the conclusion that ‘‘we don’t
‘all’ have to pay our debts’’ (Graeber 2011, p. 391). In
advocating that reciprocity need not be honoured, Graeber
is not just challenging contemporary capitalism but also the
foundations of the civitas, based on equality and reciprocity
(Graafland 2010, p. 235).
The argument that we have presented is that the norm of
reciprocity is implicit in the practice of commerce because
it enables participants in a market to converge at a con-
sensus of the price of an asset: it is a rule of market dis-
course. Reciprocity becomes explicit in Aristotelian ethics
and then in the early conceptions of mathematical proba-
bility. The norm becomes obscured as a consequence of the
‘rationalisation’ process that followed the Cartesian revo-
lution, that aimed to remove doubt from philosophy
(Bernstein 2013, Chap. 1), led to Hume’s introduction of
the fact/value dichotomy (Wilber and Hoksbergen 1986)
and the Laplacian revolution, that appeared to resolve the
issue of uncertainty in science. In the process, theory and
practice, subject and object, facts and values, means and
ends are all separated. In this environment ex cathedra
norms, in particular utility (profit) maximisation in the face
of scarcity, encroach on commercial practice. This is
exemplified by the 1950 English court case Buttle v.
Sunders ([1950] 2 All ER 193) where it was judged that
‘my word is my bond’ was subordinate to the profit max-
imisation principle. With the Nixon Shock and collapse of
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates uncer-
tainty re-emerged in the markets resulting in the failures of
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a financial economics that assumes an ergodic economy
and the existence of objective functions. Regarding mar-
kets as centres of communicative action is essentially a
response to acknowledging that markets are unpredictable
but exchange needs to take place in this indeterministic
environment.
Policy Implications of the Explanatory Hypothesis
Pragmatism demands that ‘‘we identify the meaning of an
idea with its sensible effects’’ (Bacon 2012, p. 27). This
leads us to the question of how would our experience of
finance changes if we accepted that reciprocity is the basis
of financial economics because markets are centres of
communicative action.
Caplan (2007) considers markets in the context of profit
seeking, consequentially efficient, mechanisms for distrib-
uting resources. We argue that markets are centres of
communicative action built on a norm of reciprocity that
stipulates that a profit is only possible if accompanied by
risk. There is widespread public dissatisfaction with Ca-
plan’s view and concern that profit seeking financial agents
were responsible for the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009
(e.g. Caccioli et al. 2009 which is influential on the widely
cited Haldane and May 2011; Simsek 2013). The pursuit of
profit in the face of an uncertain future makes the financial
system less stable, and so less effective at distributing
resources.
Since the Credit Crisis there has been an explosion of
alternative financial mechanisms such as peer-to-peer
lending and ‘crowdfunding’ that relate to long-established
not-for-profit institutions such as Friendly Societies and
Credit Unions. There is a view that the growth of these
mechanisms is a result of conventional finance not
effectively funding entrepreneurs (Collins et al. 2013,
p. 12). The common feature of these new mechanisms is
that, by employing new digital technologies, they enable
the financing of projects directly by individuals, without
the intermediation of financial institutions. Because
intermediaries; banks, asset manages or insurers, have a
fiduciary duty that is interpreted as maximising the returns
to their investors/depositors, they often fail to fund long
term projects that do not offer an immediate return. By
enabling direct investment, not focused on short term
profits, the emerging financial mechanisms are frequently
associated with the funding of projects that sustain com-
munities over the long term. If the claim that reciprocity
is a key foundation of financial economics is believed,
then the criteria for assessing an investment is whether
there will be a reciprocal exchange, not if it maximises
the returns to the investor. As well as justifying the
financial basis of these emergent, not-for-profit, financial
mechanisms this approach would accommodate the
concept of intergenerational reciprocity as advocated by
Stern (2008), discussed in the Introduction.
The new financial mechanisms are currently being
reviewed by regulators: UK Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA) Consultation Paper 13/13 and US SEC RIN
3235-AL37. There is concern that regulators will force the
emergent mechanisms to mimic existing structures, which
are profit maximising, destroying their beneficial distinc-
tiveness and the FCA consultation was debated in the UK
Parliament (18 December 2013, ‘Crowdfunding and the
FCA’). The reasonable concern of the regulators is that
naı¨ve investors will be tempted into schemes without merit
by manipulative financiers and the role of the regulator is to
ensure ‘fairness’ between competing investment opportu-
nities. Our response to this is that the modern financial
system alienates investors from their investments. As
explained in the Dialectic of the Enlightenment investors
have become passive consumers of financial products and
do not actively engage in finance. The new, internet based
technologies, provide the possibility of creating genuine
public spheres in which investors can engage directly with
markets as centres of communicative action. Policy
towards these emergent financial mechanisms should not
be guided solely on their ability to maximise profits, but
also their effectiveness in funding economic activity and
their ability to promote investor engagement in finance.
The evidence in this paper suggests that the opportunities
outweigh the risks of the emergent mechanisms.
A recent example of the process of investors’ alienation
emerged in 2013 as it became apparent that the English
Episcopal Church (the Church of England) was simulta-
neously campaigning against, so called, pay-day loan
companies, who offer small, short term loans at high
interest rates, while investing in them. It could be argued
that these loans do not contravene the norm of reciprocity if
the interest rate charged creates an equality between what
the lenders give and what they expect to be repaid. If the
interest is a pure credit risk premium they are not being
usurious, ‘asking for more than what was given’. However,
if the lenders do not really expect to be repaid they do not
adhere to the Quaker’s injunction that a banker, in order to
be charitable, must be confident in the borrower’s ability to
re-pay the debt.
Jonathan Levy describes how the alienation of investors
from their investment was important in the emergence of
Mortgage Backed Securities in the US in the 1880s and
how this made it difficult for the investor to be charitable
towards the borrower (Levy 2012, pp. 162–165). The
phenomenon was repeated in the lead up to the Credit
Crisis. Banks were happy to offer loans to people who had
no real prospect of repayment, simply because they were
profitable, resulting in an explosion of sub-prime lending
that was at the heart of the Crisis.
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Levy also describes how in the 1870s fraternal (mutual)
life insurance mechanisms were attacked by capitalist life
insurance companies employing the rhetoric of Laplace
and claiming that there was certainty in the actuarial sci-
ence (mathematics) that the life firms employed (Levy
2012, p. 198). The life firms seemed oblivious to the fact
that the mutuals had emerged partly in response to the
failure of actuarially managed firms which had collapsed in
the aftermath of the 1873 panic. This attitude of the nine-
teenth century corporate insurers is particularly interesting
in the context of our argument given that the origins of
actuarial science are in an explicitly charitable culture. The
first mathematically managed pension fund was the Scot-
tish Ministers’ Widows Fund, established in 1744. The
Presbyterian Church of Scotland recognised its obligations
to the widow’s of its ministers and two Edinburgh minis-
ters, Robert Wallace and Alexander Webster, acted.
Webster gathered statistical data while Wallace reviewed
the emergent literature and in 1743 Wallace was able to
calculate premiums that would deliver defined widows’
benefits with a precision that resulted in a fund whose
modelled value never deviated more than 5% from the
realised over the next thirty years (Dunop 1992; Bremner
1992; Hare 1992). Wallace and Webster can be seen as
synthesising the three ‘Christian virtues’ to create actuarial
science: charity, for the widows, faith in Webster’s statis-
tics and hope, in Wallace’s use of probability.
In the contemporary context, there is significant concern
that the involvement of mathematics in finance is not so
positive. In their submission to the Parliamentary Com-
mission on Banking Standards the Bank of England was
highly critical of how some firms have recently used
advanced mathematical techniques to ‘pull the wool’ over
the eyes of the regulator (PCBS 2013, para. 89, v. II). The
issue here is one of sincerity, identified by Habermas as
being a critical norm in communicative action. Yuthas
et al. (2002) describe the role that corporate annual reports
play in ensuring sincerity in commercial practice, we, and
the regulator, are concerned here how certain technologies
enable insincerity. For example, the practice of quote, or
order, ‘stuffing’ in high frequency trading, issuing large
numbers of orders to an exchange and then cancelling them
within a tenth, often a hundredth, of a second is widely
regarded as being an attempt to manipulate the market.
While acknowledging this concern, the UK Government
Office for Science has not advised that any legislation
should be enacted in order to prevent the practice. They use
a sporting metaphor to explain that there is a competitive
market in exchanges, and legislation would discourage
trading on the UK exchanges (Foresight 2012, Sect. 8.2).
This position contrasts with the German Parliament that
has legislated on the issue (Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz,
28/2/2013). If the markets were not regarded as
competitive arenas but were seen as centres of communi-
cative action order stuffing would not be tolerated as it
contravened the norm of sincerity/truthfulness.
The current regulatory framework can be characterised
as balancing a ‘consequentialist’ ethic: profit seeking in
order to maximise social welfare; with a ‘deontological’
ethic: that defines rules, such as capital reserving, designed
to constrain the profit seekers. Given recent financial
scandals, such as LIBOR manipulation and the ‘London
whale’ (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2013)
where advanced mathematics were employed to signifi-
cantly reduced the reported risks, this ‘carrot and stick’
approach seems flawed. An implication of reorienting
financial economics to focus on the markets as centres of
‘communicative action’ is that markets could become self-
regulating, in the same way that the legal or medical
spheres are self-regulated through professions. This is not a
libertarian argument based on freeing the consequential
ethic from a deontological brake. Rather it argues that
being a market participant entails restricting norms on the
trader, such as reciprocity, sincerity and charity, that sup-
port knowledge creation, of asset prices, within a broader
objective of social cohesion. Within this framework market
manipulation, through order stuffing, gaming the regula-
tions or forging LIBOR quotes, would be clearly illicit and
punishable by exclusion from the profession.
The Bank of England’s views (PCBS 2013, para. 89, v.
II) are related to concerns identified by professional bodies
who have been working on responding to the Parliamentary
Commission’s recommendations. While professional bod-
ies are positive about engaging retail and commercial
bankers with the ethics agenda, they have found it more
challenging to engage ‘quantitative finance’ with ethics
(Brogan 2013), reflecting the case made in West (2012).
An explanation for this could be in the fact that most
professionals working in quantitative finance are coming
out of academic fields, such as mathematics and physics,
where there is little or no focus on ethical issues. This
paper can assist professional bodies in bringing the ethics
agenda into quantitative finance.
Conclusion
The genesis of this paper was in the recognition of a formal
equivalence between the Cox–Ross–Rubinstein binomial
model for pricing derivatives (1979) and the canonical
origin of mathematical probability in the Pascal and Fermat
solution to the Problem of Points (1654). The structural
similarity is obvious and immediately raises the question of
how probability was conceived in the seventeenth century.
This question is informed by the fact that the probabilities
in the Cox–Ross–Rubinstein model are, today, understood
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in terms of Kolmogorov’s measure theoretic probability,
and not in terms of objective (frequentist) or subjective
(Bayesian) probability. Exploring the scholarship, notably
Sylla, Bellhouse, Franklin Kaye and Hadden, we under-
stand that, before Montmort and de Moivre, probability
was based on Aristotelian ethics and the requirement to
maintain equality in exchange—reciprocity—in order to
promote social cohesion. In effect, mathematical proba-
bility originates in a synthesis of Fibonacci’s commercial
mathematics and Scholastic analysis of exchange.
The Cox–Ross–Rubinstein model is today understood in
the context of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
(FTAP), which states that a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for a market to preclude arbitrage is the existence of a
martingale measure. We associate no-arbitrage with fair-
ness—equality in exchange—and martingale measures with
seventeenth century conceptions of probability to claim that
the FTAP is simply a re-stating of seventeenth century ideas
and so reciprocity is a key component of contemporary
financial economics. This is significant in the context of
Granovetter’s discussion of embeddedness in economics
(Granovetter 1985). It is conventional to assume that
mainstream economic theory is ‘undersocialised’: agents are
rational calculators seeking to maximise an objective func-
tion and this is implicit in Horrigan’s and Frankfurter and
McGoun’s criticism of modern financial economics. The
argument presented here is that a central theorem in con-
temporary economics, the FTAP, is deeply embedded in
social norms, despite being presented as an undersocialised
mathematical object. The consequence of this result is that
we can retain the paradigm of ‘New Finance’ while working
to ensure that it is a ‘nice place ethically’.
The critical difference between this paper and the work
of Horrigan and Frankfurter and McGoun is that we
identify a moral dimension to probability theory. We are
able to do this by considering the ‘pre-history’ of mathe-
matical probability and the question arises, why was the
moral dimension lost? We offer an explanation for the
disappearance of the link in the context of Adorno and
Horkenheimer’s thesis presented in Dialectic of the
Enlightenment. We highlight how in the nineteenth century
science replaces uncertainty with Laplacian determinism
(Gigerenzer 1989; Hacking 1990) and scarcity comes to
dominate economics. It was within this framework of a
strict fact/value dichotomy that the Black–Scholes and
Cox–Ross–Rubinstein models were developed. We justify
abandoning the fact/value dichotomy on the basis of
Pragmatic philosophy, which challenges the philosophical
framework laid in the Cartesian revolution and creates
links to modern Virtue Ethics.
We justify the validity our claim by employing a
Pragmatic approach and look at ‘the conceivable effects of
a practical kind’ that our claim has. We start by
highlighting that the conventional heuristic supporting the
FTAP is inadequate (Cont and Tankov 2004, 10.5.2) and
that reciprocity offers a stronger explanation. We then
employ the results of the Ultimatum Game to offer our
main justification for the claim that reciprocity is at the
heart of financial economics. The Ultimatum game is
studied from the context of both social anthropology and
cognitive sciences and the argument we make, based on
social phenomena, in favour of ‘moral markets’ is dis-
tinctive from approaches grounded in the cognitive sci-
ences, such as Zak and Jensen (2010). The essential
difference is that we reject what Habermas characterised as
the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ and we consider how
human behaviour is determined by social practices, rather
than how social practices are a consequence of neurologi-
cal phenomena. One possible explanation for for results of
the Ultimatum Game is that reciprocity is optimal in the
face of uncertainty (Delton et al. 2011), this connects to our
conjecture that the decline in concern for uncertainty led to
a decline in emphasis of reciprocity. We suggest a con-
nection with Brandom’s thoughts on norms being implicit
in practice and become explicit in theory, with the norm of
reciprocity being important in dealing with uncertainty.
Having used the empirical results of the Ultimatum
Game to support our claim we are still exposed to the
question as to whether reciprocity, and the coagmentative
concept of cooperation, are optimal for society. Our final
reason for justifying the central claim is adapted from
Misak’s justification for cooperation in politics and we
highlight connections between commerce, democracy and
science. On this basis we argue that markets should be
regarded as centres of ‘communicative action’ governed by
rules of market discourse identified here as reciprocity,
sincerity and charity. The argument that communicative
action is important in understanding commerce is not novel
(Yuthas et al. 2002), the contribution of this paper is in
identifying reciprocity as a norm of discourse in the context
of communicative action. The coherence of this claim is
based on the fact that Habermas’ theory of communicative
action was developed in response to Adorno and Horken-
heimer’s Dialectic of the Enlightenment. In this scheme
mathematics is a linguistic device to enable consensus
formation in the face of radical uncertainty, not as the
indubitable determinant of a true price and we briefly
discuss this observation in the context of some contem-
porary scholarship on markets.
Our main claim is that reciprocity is a key foundation
for financial economics, the working hypothesis to explain
the claim is that markets are centres of communicative
action. Our paper ends with a discussion of how our claim
and explanatory hypothesis would affect our experience of
markets. Specifically we argue that not-for-profit mecha-
nisms should be encouraged while certain activities, such
Foundation of Financial Economics 63
123
as order stuffing, should be inhibited and market manipu-
lation, in general, cannot be tolerated on the basis that it is
insincere. More generally we call for greater public
engagement with financial practice and the substitution of
‘carrot and stick’ by ‘professional’ regulation of financial
practice. The objective is that this paper can contribute to
this process, not least by contributing to a reversal in the
trend for economics education to promote greed, as iden-
tified in Wang et al. (2011) and supports the arguments in
Jackson (2010) and West (2012).
We note that Beckert (2009) has recently pointed out
that the coordination necessary for markets to function,
involving ‘valuation’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’,
rests on participants as having ‘‘stable reciprocal expecta-
tions’’, necessary because of the extreme (aleatory)
uncertainty that is a feature of markets. This paper is
aligned to Beckert in acknowledging the centrality of these
concepts, but we have synthesised the valuation and
cooperation problem while Beckert suggests they are ana-
lysed separately.
We see this paper as having the potential to motivate
further research in a number of fields. Obviously there is
the potential to re-interpret the whole canon of financial
economics on the basis of communicative action. While
our aims are similar to those of Horrigan and Frankfurter
and McGoun, our approach does not entail the replacement
of financial economic theory, just its re-interpretation in a
manner advocated by Rubin.
We highlight the triad of markets, politics and science
and observe that in the sixteenth and seventeenth century
this triad was characterised by a number of significant
figures: Gresham, Stevin, Huygens and Newton. Despite
the significance of all these individuals in the emergence of
modern science the impact of interactions between mar-
kets, politics and science at this time has not featured in the
historical literature. This could be an interesting topic for
further research.
Poincare´ argued that the value of mathematics was in
being able to perform experiments when physical experi-
mentation is not possible—the mathematical identification
of the Higgs Boson decades before it was technically fea-
sible to identify it empirically is a case in point. This paper
raises a question: how do we know that cooperation built
on reciprocity does lead to better outcomes for society in
the face of uncertainty? This cannot be shown through
experiment but it could be investigated mathematically.
For example, recent models analysing whether the prolif-
eration of financial instruments leads to instability (e.g.
Caccioli et al. 2009—which is influential on the widely
cited Haldane and May 2011; Simsek 2013) are based on
the assumption that agents are seeking to maximise utility;
Sahlins’ ‘negative reciprocity’, rather than acting in a
framework of ‘balanced reciprocity’. An interesting
research question would be to use the techniques of com-
plex network theory to investigate what types of financial
networks emerge, and are maintained, on the basis of either
‘negative’ reciprocity, allowing for default in the context of
the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ game, or ‘balanced’ reciprocity,
and then analyse if different network topologies are more,
or less, effective in financing or resilient to financial
shocks. This could provide some insight into the role bal-
anced reciprocity plays in supporting markets, even large
markets such as the LIBOR and foreign exchange markets
that do not match the scale of Sahlins’ ‘tribal sector’,
potentially explaining the embeddedness of reciprocity in
financial economics.
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